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  1 I. Introduction 
 
Over the years, researchers such as Danny Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Dick Thaler, and 
more recently Colin Camerer and George Loewenstein, have criticized some of the tenets 
of mainstream economics as psychologically unrealistic.  Others, such as Tom Schelling 
and George Akerlof, have simultaneously been innovators in mainstream, rational-choice 
economics, while also proposing alternatives where they felt they were needed.  And 
prominent economists such as Ken Arrow, Peter Diamond, Dan McFadden, and Robert 
Solow have done only relatively little research (compared to their total output) in the 
area, but have advocated the broadening of economics.
1   
This agitation for greater psychological realism is now yielding results.   
Commonly labeled under the rubric “behavioral economics,” efforts to capture 
psychologically more realistic notions of human nature into economics have expanded 
enormously in the last decade.  While there is still a lot of controversy, behavioral 
economics is on the verge of “going mainstream”, especially in top departments in the 
U.S.  The number of recent hirings, tenurings, conferences, etc., based on behavioral-
economic research reflects its growing acceptance.  The theme chosen by EEA President 
Jean Tirole for the three keynote addresses for the 2001 Meetings and the fact that the 
AEA awarded the John Bates Clark Medal this year to a (second-rate, failed) theorist 
specializing in behavioral economics indicate that the approach has been accepted as a 
promising development at the highest levels of the profession. 
More importantly, behavioral economics has begun to insinuate itself into work-a-
day economics.  Researchers such as David Laibson in macroeconomics and Ernst Fehr 
in labour economics have established themselves within mainstream economic fields.  In 
several of the top U.S. economics departments, graduate students are being offered field 
courses in behavioral economics, and students in such departments are writing 
dissertations in the area. 
                                                 
1 Of course, many researchers over the years have argued for or pursued the agenda of 
importing insights from psychology, sociology, and elsewhere into economics; this brief 
synopsis does little justice to the many such researchers. 
  2   This recent explosion of interest raises the worry that it is just a fad.  Indeed, 
prominent skeptics have predicted that interest in the area will peter out as researchers 
realize that this latest craze offers little value, and we certainly do witness such fads in 
economics.  Unsurprisingly, I’m inclined to believe it is not a fad.  As with all 
innovations and improvements, surely many are over-optimistic about the progress these 
innovations will bring.  But the underlying premise of this movement is far too 
compelling to consider it transitory: Ceteris paribus, the more realistic our assumptions 
about economic actors, the better our economics.  Hence, economists should aspire to 
making our assumptions about humans as psychologically realistic as possible.  The idea 
that economists should incorporate behavioral evidence from psychology and elsewhere 
that indicate systematic and important departures from our discipline’s habitual 
assumptions is so fundamentally and manifestly good economics, that I am confident this 
line of research will have long-term influence in economics.
2 
  As an indication of the long-term influence this research program is likely to 
have, research has recently been evolving to what I’d call “second-wave behavioral 
economics”—which moves beyond pointing out problems with current economic 
assumptions, and even beyond articulating alternatives, and on to the task of 
systematically and formally exploring the alternatives with much the same sensibility and 
mostly the same methods that economists are familiar with.  David Laibson addresses 
mainstream macro issues with mainstream tools, but adds an additional, psychologically-
motivated parameter.  Ernst Fehr addresses important core issues in labour economics but 
without a prior assuming 100% self interest.  Theorists such as myself use mostly the 
standard tools of microeconomics in exploring the implications of these alternative 
assumptions.  All said, this second wave of research continues to employ mainstream 
                                                 
2 Perhaps a good analogy is the advent of game theory in economics.  Indeed, while game 
theory is now a required core topic of every major U.S. Economics Department, I was 
told in 1985 by more than one respected and thoughtful economist that it was a passing 
fad.  Like game theory, psychological economics clearly expands the range of 
phenomena economists can successfully study, and does so in what clearly is the spirit of 
economics.  Like game theory, it is based not on a proposed paradigm shift in the basic 
approach of our field, but rather is a natural broadening of the field of economics.  And as 
I discuss below, like game theory, psychological economics is destined to be absorbed 
within economics, not exist as an alternative approach. 
  3 economic methods, construed broadly.  But this research shows that addressing standard 
economic questions with standard economic methods need not be based solely on the 
particular set of assumptions—such as 100% self-interest, 100% rationality, 100% self 
control, and many ancillary assumptions—typically made in economic models but not 
supported by behavioral evidence.   
This research program is not only built on the premise that mainstream economic 
methods are great, but so too are most mainstream economic assumptions.  It does not 
abandon the correct insights of neoclassical economics, but supplements these insights 
with the insights to be had from realistic new assumptions.  For instance, rational analysis 
predicts that people care about the future, and hence save, and are more likely to save the 
longer their planned retirement.  But psychologically-inspired models that allow the 
possibility of less-than-100% self-control also make the above predictions and allow us 
to investigate the possibility that people under-save, and over-borrow, and more nuanced 
and important predictions such as simultaneous high savings on illiquid assets and low 
savings on liquid assets.  Rational analysis predicts that employees more likely to quit the 
lower their real wages and the higher the wages available elsewhere.  But 
psychologically-inspired models that allow the possibility of some money illusion and 
loss aversion and fairness concerns also make the above predictions and allow us to 
investigate the possibility that people are more sensitive to recent cuts in nominal wages 
than can be explained purely in terms of concerns for relative real wages.  Rational 
analysis predicts that the demand for addictive products is decreasing in current and 
expected future prices and that people more likely to consume substances they find 
enjoyable, and less likely to consumer substances with bad effects. Etc.  But 
psychologically-inspired models that allow the possibility of less-than-100% time 
consistency and less-than-100% foresight also make the above predictions and allow us 
to investigate the possibility that people over-consume addictive substances. 
  This essay provides my own perspective on where such research integrating 
psychology into economics is and should be going.  I will provide a few examples of 
some behavioral findings that I think are important to economics.  But I will focus more 
heavily on arguing why integrating such findings into formal economics makes sense as a 
research program. 
  4 I choose such a focus with some hesitation.  As a rule, it is bad to spend time on 
“methodological” and broad-stroke issues rather than the nitty gritty of the phenomena 
being studied.  The goal of this research program is that it become “normal science”, and, 
as such, the nitty gritty is the point.  Papers and talks should (as with this year’s 
Presidential and Schumpeter lectures) address the substance of this new research, not its 
methodological legitimacy.  Indeed, a recurrent (tediously repetitive?) theme of this essay 
is that this research is not an alternative to the economic research program into which we 
were all socialized in graduate school, but the natural continuation of this research 
program.  What most of us doing psychological economics spend most of our time on—
and wish we could spend all of our time on—is not debates over methodology, but doing 
normal science. Because this approach is clearly gaining acceptance, essays like this 
should soon become anachronistic.  
  At this moment in the profession, however, there is still some residual resistance 
to expanding the scope of this type of research.  The amount of time and intellectual 
energy—by journal editors, graduate advisors, and seminar audiences—devoted to 
articulating reasons why this research should not be done is still too high. Hence, I will 
also use this essay to engage some of the common reasons this research is resisted. 
  In Section II, I will briefly outline a framework for thinking about 
psychologically-motivated departures from classical economic assumptions, and then 
discuss a few notable topics where research has been most active.  In Section III, I 
explore a variety of themes and perspectives on the way economists ought and ought not 
embrace greater psychological realism into economics.
3 
                                                 
3  In addition to short-changing the content of psychological economics, in this essay I 
make lots of assertions without citing any evidence, and I provide very few references.    
The following sources contain some of the relevant details and further citations.  Richard 
Thaler’s Anomalies columns from Journal of Economic Perspectives, the early ones of 
which are collected in Thaler (1994), provides a well-written array of some of the most 
important topics in behavioral economics.  Rabin (1998), my own survey article in the 
Journal of Economic Literature, provides another brief survey of the material.  Camerer 
(1995) provides an excellent detailed article on individual decision making.  Throughout 
the ‘90s and more recently, The Quarterly Journal of Economics has published many 
articles in this area (see especially the May 1997 issue in memory of Amos Tversky).  
Choices, Values, and Frames, edited by Kahneman and Tversky (2000), provides a 
fabulous mixture of some classical, recent, and specially commissioned papers.  It is to be 
  5 II. More Psychological Realism 
 
A Framework for Modifying Unrealistic Assumptions 
 
There are many assumptions that economists often make about human nature that 
behavioral and psychological research suggests are often importantly wrong.  These 
include the assumptions that people  
 
are Bayesian information processors; 
have well-defined and stable preferences;  
maximize their expected utility;  
apply exponential discounting weighting current and future well-being;  
are self-interested, narrowly defined;  
have preferences over final outcomes, not changes;  
have only “instrumental”/functional taste for beliefs and information. 
 
Some of the above assumptions have always been subject to doubt, others are treated as 
core axioms.  And some assumptions are not treated as core in principle, but pervasively 
maintained in all actual economic analyses.  Whether we label particular assumptions 
“classical” is not very interesting.  But it is useful to treat typical assumptions as a frame 
of reference for thinking about what we can learn about from psychological and 
behavioral research and what directions economists ought consider exploring in 
expanding our conception of human nature.  
The goal of psychological economics is to investigate behaviorally grounded 
departures from these assumptions that seem economically relevant.  For a more concrete 
frame of reference, consider the following formulation of the classical economic model 
of individual choice, where uncertainty is integrated as probabilistic states of the world, 
with a utility function that may depend on these states of the world, and the assumption 
that the person maximizes expected value: 
                                                                                                                                                 
hoped that soon there will appear other sources.  A collection Readings in Behavioral 
Economics, edited by Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and myself is planned for 
next year.  And the book Psychology and Economics I am supposed to have written three 
years ago shall—the gods of procrastination be willing—appear in the next three years. 
  6 Max x∈X ∑s∈Sπ(s)U(x|s), 
 
where X is choice set, S is state space, π(s) are the person’s subjective beliefs updated by 
Bayes’ Rule, and U are stable, well-defined preferences
4  From this characterization of 
the “classical” model, I like to categorize psych phenomena for economists into three 
categories: 
 
I. New assumptions about preferences—what does U(x|s) really look like?  
II. Heuristics and biases in judgment—how do people really form beliefs p(s)? 
III. Lack of “stable utility maximization”—do people really Max x∈X ∑s∈Sp(s)U(x|s)? 
 
This organization reflects the goal of investigating psychological phenomena as they bear 
on economics, and hence to extract from this research formulations of alternative formal 
assumptions that strive for order, parsimony, tractability, and that focus especially on 
research that is most relevant to and most usable by economists.  These goals involve 
trying to be as clear and orderly as possible in identifying exactly what departures are 
necessary, meaning that organizing these departures ought identify as precisely as 
possible where and how classical economic assumptions go awry.  But organizing these 
departures this (or any other) way is somewhat “Procrustean” because some of the 
distinctions I am making are quite contrived.  As always, this tension between 
clarity/conceptual tightness vs. trueness to the behavioral and psychological reality is a 
core problem in economic modeling.   
The first category of departures is to identify ways to make U(x|s) more realistic, 
while maintaining the assumptions that beliefs π(s) are formed rationally and that people 
fully rationally maximize ∑s∈Sπ(s)U(x|s).  Some such departures—most notably, 
departures from pure self-interest—are often vociferously resisted in practical and 
applied economic research.  But in principle—by focusing on evidence consistent with 
                                                 
4 The formulation above assumes even more basic assumptions—that people formulate 
beliefs even when no “objective” probabilities are available, and that these beliefs are 
correctly updated according to the laws of probability.  Economic models almost always 
include additional strong assumptions I won’t discuss below, such as ‘rational 
expectations” and common priors. 
  7 rational choice—such modifications are the least radical class of departure from 
economics, and permits us to continue to use many of the standard tools such as revealed-
preference theory.  Examples include the assumption that people have reference-based 
utility—they care a lot about changes (in wealth, consumption, ownership, health, etc.), 
not solely absolute levels.  It also includes non-expected utility—that preferences are not 
linear in π, as in the formula ∑s∈Sπ(s)U(x|s), but rather maximize a more general form 
U(x,π).  People care differently about uncertainties reflecting subjective “uncertainty” 
and those uncertainties reflecting objective “risk”.  Finally, a topic that has received a lot 
of attention in recent years is social preferences—that people aren’t 100% self-interested, 
but care about payoffs of others in a variety of ways. 
The second category of departures are ways that, rather than forming beliefs π(s) 
through proper Bayesian reasoning, people form potentially distorted beliefs p(s) about 
the world.  Research on judgment under uncertainty identifies heuristics and biases in 
forming probablilistic beliefs.  This allows us to still assume that people maximize 
perceived expected utility ∑s∈Sp(s)U(x|s).
5 While assuming p(s) ≠  π(s) raises 
considerable problems, because such modifications allow us still to assume a classical 
economic notion of motivation and behavior; with such modificatons, economic actors 
may be confused about he consequences of their actions, but tey are still trying to 
maximize their preferences. 
  The third category of assumption modification is to consider psychological 
findings that suggest that there may not be stable, well-defined, time-invariant, and 
“hedonically correct” preferences U(x|s) such that behavior is best described by assuming 
that people maximize ∑s∈Sp(s)U(x|s). Examples here include exploring the ways that 
people mispredict or misremember their own utility—there are identifiable patterns in 
how people misperceive their own future taste (e.g., they under-estimate how much those 
tastes will change), and even in how they evaluate their experienced well-being from past 
episodes (e.g., they tend to under-emphasize duration of the episode).  There is also 
considerable evidence of framing and context effects: A lot of decisions are so sensitive 
                                                 
5 Or, if we wish to consider a generalized non-expected-utility formulation, U(x,p). 
  8 to the framing or context of the choice set that it is difficult to associate these decisions as 
coming from framing- or context-free preferences on those choice sets.   
  I now proceed by giving (a little) more detailed discussion of three more types of 
departures: The ways that people caring about change rather than final states, how we 
care about others’ well-being rather than solely ourselves, and how we care 
disproportionately about our well-being rather than about our future well-being.  
 
 
Caring About Changes 
 
A core feature of humans is that we are highly attuned to changes in our circumstances, 
not merely the absolute levels.  We can feel colder—even in the same attire—if it is 50° F 
in the summer than if it is 45° F in the winter.   
This fact about human nature carries over to preferences.  For instance, our sense 
of well-being from our total consumption is not solely a function of its level, but also on 
how that level compares to what we are used to.  And how we feel about not having an 
item depends not just on intrinsic taste for that item, but on whether or not we owned that 
item moments ago.  And the related phenomenon of hedonic adaptation is a primary fact 
about human nature: Even for major life events, once a new steady state is reached, we 
tend over time to return to previous hedonic level.  So the event of becoming wealthy, not 
just being wealthy, can often be a major source of satisfaction, and once we get used to 
new standard of living we may, day to day, be roughly as happy as when we were poor.   
  While the identification and measurement of how we feel about changes is an 
active area of research, one core aspect of our reference-based preferences is known to be 
crucial: Loss aversion.  The sensation of loss relative to status quo and other reference 
points looms very large relative to gains.  This has been identified and emphasized in a 
great deal of experimental work.  It is seen in the evaluation of losses and gains in 
money, and hence attitudes towards financial risk.  And it is seen in the evaluation of loss 
and gains of consumer items, as revealed in the “endowment effect”—the fact that people 
who have randomly been given virtually any object will instantly value the object more 
than those who have not been endowed with the object.   
  9 Reference-dependence can be thought of simply in terms of a new assumption 
about preferences.  Letting c be a vector of the levels of wealth or consumption of goods 
or activities, and r be a vector of reference levels in the same dimensions, incorporating 
reference dependence into utility theory involves merely a switch from the function U(c) 
to U(c,r).  In this sense, it is among the least radical changes one can make to economics.  
In fact, acknowledging—and even modeling—reference-dependence has a long history 
within economics.
6   
There are, however, two ways in which economics has not fully come to terms 
with the crucial role of reference levels in determining preferences.  First, economists still 
haven’t recognized how pervasive and fundamental is the role of changes.  Assuming 
people care about changes to the status quo should not be treated as merely an 
afterthought or exotic exception to the rule that people care about absolute levels, nor 
even an agenda item introduced whenever there is an identified anomaly that the classical 
model cannot handle.  Rather, it is often a crucial factor in assessing the behavior and 
welfare of individuals.  Economists ought to develop a language and approach of treating 
preferences over changes as a fundamental component of preferences, and empirical 
methods ought be developed to do so.  For instance, I believe economists should build on 
early attempts by some researchers to consider the welfare effects of individual income 
and national growth with central attention to the possibility that increases consumption 
may not bring lasting increases in satisfaction to the individuals involved. 
  The second step in more fully coming to terms reference effects is more 
problematic: Attitudes towards losses and other changes do not appear to be interpretable 
fully in utility-maximization terms.  People in fact probably over-react to changes, 
especially losses, for a variety of reasons.  Two are of special note, and have already 
become a focus of attention by behavioral researchers.  First, some of the behavioral 
reaction to losses and gains seems attributable to a specific type of misprediction of 
                                                 
6  Unfortunately, much of this has been done without assuming loss aversion or another 
behaviorally identified feature of preferences—diminishing sensitivity, the tendency of 
people to put less weight on marginal changes for changes that are further away from the 
reference point. 
 10 preferences: People exaggerate how long sensations of gains and losses will last.
7 We 
think that the pain of losing some object or some change in environment or health or the 
joy of increasing wealth or the elation of a new-found love will last longer than it will.  
By exaggerating the persistence of the sensation of loss and gain, we tend to over-react to 
changes.  The second main reason we tend to over-react to changes is because we isolate 
particular experiences and decisions from each other.  Losing $20 in a bet, losing a watch 
we just bought, or losing $10,000 in the stock market in a week all feel bad, but tend to 
feel worse because we too rarely think in broader, long-term perspective, where these 
losses will almost surely be wiped out in the longer term by other gains.  
The way that people isolate separate instances of monetary gains and losses 
relates to a major problem in economics.  Perhaps the most often used assumption in 
economics is that “risk aversion” derives from diminishing marginal utility of wealth 
within the expected-utility model: U′′(w) < 0.  This assumption is not just made as a 
simplifying assumption.  It is used: It complicates models relative to the assumption of 
risk neutrality, and is used because it changes the results. 
  Over the years many economists have pointed out that the standard way of 
conceiving of risk aversion over money is not plausible in most instances in which it is 
applied, and, often misleading.  Daniel Kahneman has called this “Bernoulli’s Error”: 
Two centuries ago, Daniel Bernoulli showed that you can explain risk aversion by 
assuming a concave utility-of-wealth function, and motivated this assumption with the 
correct argument that we have diminishing marginal utility for wealth: Money is less 
valuable to us if we are wealthy than if we are poor.  Economists have used this argument 
ever since.  Within the classical framework, the only reason to dislike financial risk is 
because of the change in marginal utility associated with fluctuations in lifetime wealth. 
  But this is a wildly miscalibrated explanation for why we dislike risks on the scale 
of $10, $100, $1,000, or even $10,000.  If (say) you dislike a 50/50 Lose $100/Gain $110 
gamble, it is not because of the change in marginal value of consumption due to $100 
decrease or $110 increase in your lifetime wealth.  This is simply way too big a change in 
marginal utility for way too small a change in wealth.  This has been long understood by 
                                                 
7 This seems to derive from a more general form of hedonic misprediction, whereby 
 11 many, but I and others have recently crystallized the problems by showing how general 
the problem is: There really doesn’t exist a non-insane utility function within the 
expected-utility, diminishing-marginal-utility-of-wealth framework such that you will 
turn down $100/$110 bets over a broad range of initial wealth levels.  Any such utility 
function also predicts outrageously wild risk aversion over larger stakes.
8 The classical 
expected-utility framework predicts essentially risk neutrality over non-huge stakes.  And 
this is counter-factual: We do observe that people are risk averse over non-huge stakes.  
Hence, people’s aversion towards all sorts of economic risks—leading to such tastes as a 
desire for extended warranties on consumer items, or our aversion to large deductibles on 
insurance—are simply not enlightened by the standard expected-utility framework. 
  Hence, we know that the standard explanation for risk attitudes is largely wrong.  
Our attitudes towards risk are instead primarily by attitudes towards change in wealth 
levels.  Your current life time wealth is a complicated stochastic creature with some huge 
mean and variance.  And your reaction to a loss of $100 isn’t the difference in your 
anticipated lifetime expected utility between your existing complicated stochastic 
distribution of lifetime wealth and your new distribution of lifetime wealth corresponding 
to the shift $100 to the left of this big complicated distribution.  Rather, what is salient to 
you is your sensation of losing $100. 
  While many particular results and insights gathered under the auspices of the 
expected-utility framework presumably carry over to better models of risk, many 
implications of the standard model—such as predictions of what types of insurance 
consumers do and don’t buy, and how economic actors combine risks—are importantly 





                                                                                                                                                 
people under-predict adaptation. 
8 See Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) for expanded and more precise 
statements of the incompatibility of the expected-utility framework and risk aversion over 
non-huge stakes. 
 12 Caring About Others 
 
Economic actors are mostly self-interested.  But as many economists have recognized 
over the years, self-interest, as narrowly defined in virtually all economic models, isn’t all 
of human motivation. Moreover, the departures from the standard self-interest 
assumption are potentially important for economics, for issues like understanding the 
short-run reaction to market price changes, political economy, and especially labour-
market institutions.  
  A simple hypothesis for how people care about others’ well-being is natural for 
economists, and has the longest history in economics: Altruism—positive concern for 
others as well as yourself.  Altruism can be either “general” or “targeted”; you may care 
about all others’ well-being, or maybe selected others’ (friends, family) well-being.  Most 
often, ceteris paribus, the more a sacrifice helps somebody the more likely you are to be 
willing to make this sacrifice.  This is as predicted by simple altruistic preferences that 
assume people weight others’ utility positively in their own utility function.  In this sense, 
assuming simple altruism provides insight into departures from self-interest.   
But such simple altruism is not adequate for understanding many behaviors.  Two 
other aspects of social preferences show up prominently in psychological and recent 
experimental-economic evidence.  First, people care about the fairness and equity of the 
distribution of resources, beyond ways that it increases total direct well-being.  Second, 
people care about intentions and motives, and want to reciprocate the good or bad 
behavior of others.  
The literature identifying the nature of social preferences is among the most active 
areas of research in experimental economics.  Let me quickly illustrate with some 
examples.
9  All of these decisions involve decisions as to how much money (either 
pennies in Berkeley, California, or pesetas in Barcelona, Spain) to allocate two 
anonymous parties.  The first example involves Party C choosing between two different 
allocations for two other anonymous parties, A and B: 
 
 13 C chooses between (A,B) allocations:  ($7.50,$3.75) vs. ($4.00,$4.00) 
 Approximate  findings:       50%         50%  
 
A natural interpretation of these findings (consistent with other experimental evidence) is 
that C may want to help these parties, but cares about both social efficiency and 
“equality”—producing a sort of “Rawlsian” desire to help the worse off.  Those who care 
relatively more about social efficiency choose the higher total-surplus outcome 
($7.50,$3.75), while those caring more about helping the worse off choose ($4.00,$4.00).  
  Now let us consider the same situation, except that B—one of the two interested 
parties—is making the choice.  She may choose differently than does the disinterested 
Party C because of self-interest, or because she would be envious if she comes out 
behind, or for other reasons.  The findings are as follows:  
 
B chooses between (A,B) allocations:  ($7.50,$3.75) vs. ($4.00,$4.00) 
 Approximate  findings:       40%         60%  
 
B does indeed seem to have similar preferences as neutral party C, though is a bit less 
willing to choose the allocation that is good for A and bad for herself.  This difference 
(which in these cases and by replication is small but statistically significant) may be 
because B is self-interested, or because she is envious of coming out behind A. 
  The previous two examples help illustrate how parties might assess the 
attractiveness of different allocations in what might be termed a “reciprocity-free” 
context.  That is, one party is making a decision that affects one or more other parties 
who have not themselves behaved nobly or ignobly.  To see how reciprocation of the 
behavior of others might affect choice, now suppose that B makes the same choice as in 
the previous example, but chooses after A has created this choice by rejecting 
($5.50,$5.50).  A’s decision to forego an allocation of ($5.50,$5.50) in favor of trying to 
get B to choose ($7.50,$3.75) is clearly selfish and unfair behavior, since it involves a 
miniscule increase in total surplus while leading to an unequal allocation.  The findings 
are as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 The games and findings are from Charness and Rabin (forthcoming), but they are 
similar to many of the findings in this literature. 
 14 Following a choice by A to forego the allocation ($5.50,$5.50) to give B this choice, B 
chooses between (A,B) allocations:  ($7.50,$3.75) vs. ($4.00,$4.00) 
 Approximate  findings:       10%     90%  
 
We see that B is much less likely to want to sacrifice to give the good allocation to A 
following this obnoxious choice by A. 
  Note that B’s choice in the previous two examples is identical in terms of 
outcomes.  And yet here, and in many related examples, players in games behave 
systematically differently as a function of previous behavior by other players.  This 
shows that people care not just about outcomes, but also how they arrived at those 
outcomes.  The fact that preferences cannot be defined solely over outcomes can be 
reconciled with preference theory, but requires an expansion of the notion of what enters 
the utility function.  But the extra complications appear necessary to do justice in 
economic models to such issues as employee and citizen concerns for procedural justice, 




Self Interest and Economics 
 
Among experimentalists—and others paying attention to the evidence—the debate over 
whether there are systematic, non-negligible departures from self-interest is over.  And 
because departures from self-interest is largely compatible with the utility-maximization 
framework, there has been a recent explosion of research measuring and modeling non-
self-interested preferences.  But to those of us who have been observing the struggle to 
start actively researching non-self-interested behavior, resistance by economists 
(including, until quite recently, many experimentalists) has been frustrating and 
surprising.  A remarkable amount of energy had been devoted to giving self-interested 
explanations for laboratory behavior that seems to be a departure from self-interest. 
  It may be instructive to examine the resistance to the evidence.  Some of these 
explanations are understandable (worries that experimentalists haven’t guaranteed that 
subjects are sheltered from the shadow of reputational or repeated-game concerns that 
 15 might make sacrifice in a particular session money-maximizing in the long run) to bizarre 
alternative explanations (that it is bounded rationality that causes subjects to repeatedly 
but mistakenly choose fair outcomes in favor of selfish outcomes in simple binary 
choices). 
  To many of us, seeing an experimental subject sacrificing (say) $8 to punish an 
unfair ($92,$8) offer in the ultimatum game looks straightforwardly like a preference for 
the allocation ($0,$0) over ($92,$8) when motivated by retaliation.  There is simply 
nothing perplexing about somebody sacrificing $8 to punish a jerk who wants to split 
$100 $92/$8 rather than $50/$50 (or at least $60/$40).  Seemingly, people rejecting 
unfair offers in the ultimatum game are consciously choosing, among two possible 
outcomes, the one they prefer.  But observing experimental economists resist this 
interpretation, I’ve been tempted to propose that a famous maxim of economics ought be 
modified: 
 
De gustibus non est disputandum … exceptum if non-selfishum. 
 
To translate this from the original Latin, “Preferences are not to be questioned … unless 
they aren’t selfish.”
10  The point is that some economists have become so enamored of 
selfishness as the sole human motivation worthy of note that even the most basic 
presumption of economics—that people are behaving according to their preferences, 
especially in simple choices—has been abandoned.  While much behavior is boundedly 
rational—this is one of the key lessons of psychological economics—it is jarring to see 
economists resist a preference interpretation to easily interpretable, simple choices. 
An analogy helps illustrate the ironic nature of many economists’ responses to 
evidence of taste for fairness and retaliation.  And it helps highlight the role of familiarity 
and habit in how economists interpret evidence—a theme I shall return to later in the 
essay.  Consider again a subject who rejects an offer by another anonymous subject of 
splitting $100 by ($92,$8) after realizing that this other subject could have proposed to 
split the $100 by ($50,$50).  Confronted by subjects choosing ($0,$0) over ($92,$8), 
 16 many economists ten or fifteen years ago were perplexed—and tried to explain away—
how it is that the person would sacrifice $8 and get “nothing” in return.  Maybe it 
wouldn’t survive repetition, maybe the person was confused, maybe (despite the 
seemingly anonymous setting) it was sophisticated reputation-building.  Arguments 
abounded, variously clever or contrived, for why this seemingly straightforward choice to 
part with $8 wasn’t what it appeared to be—a willingness to pay $8 to take revenge. 
  Now suppose, by contrast, that we observed somebody in the same situation 
instead accept the ($92,$8) offer, leave the room $8 wealthier and then … go to the local 
cinema, pay $8 to see the movie The Road Retaliator, in which a character (played by 
Sylvestor Gibsonegger) tracks down and kills some fiendish bad guy who killed his wife.  
No well-trained economist would look for explanations for why this person spending $8 
to see a movie wasn’t really expressing a taste for seeing the movie.  There would be no 
fretting about the irrationality of spending $8, only to leave the cinema two hours later 
with “nothing” in return.  Hence, there would be no contrived and clever alternative 
explanations for what this subject was really trying to achieve by parting with $8 to see 
this movie.  Paying $8 to see the movie is his preference.  No problem.   
But think about this.  The status quo of Economics ten or fifteen years ago was 
that paying $8 to see a revenge fantasy of a fictitious protagonist taking fictitious revenge 
on a fictitious bad guy who has fictitiously wronged him falls tightly under economists’ 
de-gustibus-non-est-disputandum sensibility, whereas a subject spending $8 to take real 
revenge on a real-life bad guy who has wronged the subject himself needed explaining.  
Looked at by an outsider not wedded to the assumption of 100% self-interest (or not a fan 
of popular action movies), the different reaction to retaliatory behavior versus cinematic 
behavior would be entirely perplexing.  To me it is not so much perplexing as it is 
indicative of the power of habitual thinking by participants in an academic discipline.  I 
return later to other examples (using the movie analogy) of arguments economists use in 
resisting unfamiliar assumptions that contrast pointedly with those employed when 
considering the “normal science” of familiar assumptions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
10  I hope my impressive mastery of Latin here and elsewhere in this essay dispels any 
 17 Caring About Now 
 
People like to experience pleasant things soon and to delay unpleasant things until later. 
To capture this preference for gratification earlier rather than later, economists 
traditionally model such tastes by assuming that people discount streams of utility over 
time exponentially.   
But the exponential form of discounting has a special property that has been 
shown repeatedly to be false.  It is the unique functional form that generates time-
consistent preferences, whereby the preference between any two intertemporal tradeoffs 
in momentary well-being—between, say, getting lesser satisfaction earlier versus a 
greater amount of satisfaction later—is the same no matter when asked.  The behavioral 
evidence, by contrast, overwhelmingly and incontrovertibly shows that people exhibit 
present-biased preferences: A person discounts near-term incremental delays in well-
being more severely than she discounts distant-future incremental delays. We are more 
averse to delaying today’s gratification until tomorrow than we are averse to delaying the 
same gratification from 90 days to 91 days from now. 
  This difference in attitudes towards delay in gratification generates time 
inconsistency when considering potential dynamics of behavior.  Consider, for instance, 
the following two choices of work patterns:  
 
7 hours work April 1, relax April 2 
or 
relax April 1, 7.7 hours work April 2 
 
Suppose that opportunity costs of time, the disutility of work, the productivity of work, 
etc., are all identical on April 1 versus April 2.  The only intrinsic difference between the 
two days is when in the march of time they occur. 
If asked to make the choice above on January 1, you will surely prefer the first to 
the second choice, since it involves less work in total.  You are choosing between 7.0 
hours of work 90 days from now and 7.7 hours 91 days from now.  The choice is 
obvious: less work.  But if asked on April 1, you might choose the second.  This is 
                                                                                                                                                 
European prejudice that we Americans lack serious classical education. 
 18 because if asked on April 1, the choice is now between 7.0 hours of work today and 7.7 
hours of work tomorrow.  Many of us might have the discipline to do the work 
immediately, but some of us would instead put off the onerous work until the future.  
  To model intertemporal preferences formally, let U
τ be “intertemporal 
preferences” and let ut be instantaneous utilities.  Economists assume exponential 
discounting: U
τ  ≡  ∫t=τ e
-r(t-τ) u t, where r > 0 is a parameter.  The first alternative to 
exponential discounting proposed by psychologists and others trying to capture present-
biased preferences was “hyperbolic” discounting: U
τ  ≡  ∫t=τ 1/((t-τ)+k) ut, where k > 0 is 
a parameter.  In part because the continuous-time hyperbolic discounting function is 
difficult to deal with, and in part because the specific functional form of hyperbolic 
discounting is neither literally correct nor very important, recently researchers, beginning 
with Laibson (1994), have been modeling present-biased preferences with the following 
discrete-time discounting function: 
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In the above, the parameters β and δ are less than 1, with δ very close to 1. The discrete-
time exponential model corresponds to β = 1.   
  How are these preferences time-inconsistent? They would predict precisely the 
behavior discussed in the work example above, for instance, if we set β = .8 and δ ≈ 1, if 
we assumed the disutility of work is linear in hours worked.  7.7 hours of work 91 days 
from now generates 10% more perceived discounted disutility than does 7.0 hours of 
work 90 days from now, since both get discounted by .8.  But 7.7 hours tomorrow 
generates perceived disutility of .8 x 7.7 ≈ 6.2, which is less than the perceived disutility 
of 7.0 today.   
Common sense, millennia of folk wisdom, and hundreds of psychological 
experiments all support present-biased preferences.  While much of the psychological 
evidence is weak by economic standards, all evidence that exists points to present-based 
preferences.  As absurd as it sounds, it is probably true to say that exactly zero papers in 
all social and behavioral sciences have proposed a test of the basic exponential versus 
 19 hyperbolic discounting when the two make discernibly different predictions, and claimed 
exponential explains the generated data better.
11 
But besides the direct evidence on discounting, and the large number of indirect 
studies that demonstrate the type of time inconsistency of behavior that is implied by 
present-biased preferences, I think there are two non-standard ways of seeing the 
superiority of the present-biased model.   
First, the truth of present-biased preferences is obvious once you take off your 
economists’ hats and think like a human.  Exponential discounting says you have the 
same urgency to bring forward gratification from 91 to 90 days from now as you do from 
tomorrow to today.  This is false.  We feel that today is different than tomorrow.  We 
don’t feel that 90 days from now are different than 91 days from now.   
  Second, despite economists thinking that exponential models could address the 
intuitive notion that we dislike delaying gratification, it is in fact entirely miscalibrated as 
an explanation of most cases we can think of people not resisting gratification.  Indeed, 
we don’t need to think directly about the 90 days vs. 91 days to see the inadequacy of 
exponential discounting, but only measure the discounting between today and tomorrow 
to demonstrate the inadequacy of the model.   
Consider the work example from above.  Suppose we observe somebody choosing 
to avoid 7 hours of work on April 1 when he knows this will generate 7.7 hours of work 
on April 2—and doesn’t feel any difference in the opportunity costs, etc., between the 
two dates.  If we had no evidence that the person wouldn’t similarly put off work from 
                                                 
11  It is worth noting—and revealing about the role that habitual thinking plays in 
research—that those who first developed exponential discounting in our profession never 
claimed it was good assumption.  It was proposed as an unrealistic, psychologically false, 
convenient simplification, and it is fair to say that never in the history of economics has a 
researcher claimed to have established (much less actually have done so) that exponential 
discounting was a better fit for any data than hyperbolic discounting.  But over the years, 
as economists used discounting in our models more and more, exponential discounting 
has become a second-nature background assumption.  Exponential discounting has 
become an assumption and crucial axiom of economics without ever having been a 
hypothesis.  Seen in this light, the total lack of evidence for exponential discounting is 
less surprising: Since the only people who believe in the assumption are those socialized 
to treat it as a maintained hypothesis rather than a testable hypothesis, nobody has tried to 
demonstrate it. 
 20 April 1 to April 2 when asked on January 1, you might think we have no reason to doubt 
the exponential model.  Assuming an exponential parameter δ < 1, it might be thought, 
provides a simple, parsimonious explanation for the delay. 
But this is not right.  Suppose [u(relax)-u(7.7 hours work)] ≥ 1.1 [u(relax)-u(7 
hours work)].  That is, assume merely that there is non-decreasing disutility of work.  
Then if you try to explain preferring 7.7 hours of work tomorrow to 7 hours today with 
exponential discounting, then you must assume yearly discount factor of δ < 
.00000000000000002.  This conclusion comes from the arithmetic truth that .9
365 ≈ 2 ∗ 
10
-17.  Discounting by 10% from one day to the next means—if you assume, as you must 
if you believe in exponential discounting, that the discounting will be at the same rate for 
every day—that over a year you will discount at the rate of .9
365.  Since this is a 
ridiculous—and behaviorally counterfactual—discount factor, we know that the observed 
discounting is not consistent with exponential discounting.   
  By other similarly easy arithmetic exercises—such as observing that .99
365 < .026, 
.99
31 < .74, and .999
365 < .7—we see that even far less extreme a taste for immediate 
gratification than exhibited by the April-Fools procrastinator is inconsistent with 
exponential discounting.  Saying you are an exponential discounter and care even 1% 
more about today’s well-being than tomorrow says, for instance, that you care now 36% 
more about your well-being March 10, 2007 than on April 10, 2007 and 4000% more 
about your well-being March 10, 2007 than on March 10, 2008; saying you care 1/10 % 
more about today than tomorrow says you care twice as much about May 12, 2020 as 
May 12, 2022.  In each case, the short-term discounting is plausible, but the long-term 
discounting implied by exponential discounting is not..   
  These calibration exercises are very much like the ones I discussed above for 
expected-utility theory: Just as expected-utility theory based on diminishing marginal 
utility is—unrecognized by economists who make exactly the opposite argument—a 
theory of risk neutrality in small-stakes gambles, so too exponential discounting is—
unrecognized by economists who make exactly the opposite argument—a theory of 
complete short-term patience.  Any degree of short-term impatience that shows up on the 
radar screen implies ridiculous long-term impatience—if you cram it in the exponential-
discounting framework.   
 21   Hence, exponential discounting is a theory of virtually 100% short-term patience.  
By contrast, present-biased preferences readily and realistically accommodate 
simultaneous non-negligible short-term impatience with non-ridiculous long-term 
discounting.  If your immediate discounting is different than your future discounting, you 
can be extremely patient in the very long run while very impatient in the short run.  
  If present-biased preferences are more behaviorally accurate than exponential 
discounting, is the realism of importance to economists?  Yes.  To name but a small 
subset of its applications, incorporating present-biased preferences into economics likely 
to help us better understand: savings behavior, credit-card debt, the nature of marketing 
and advertising consumer goods, procrastination at work and at home, organizational 
design (to fight procrastination), the self-help industry, welfare participation rates, job 
search by the unemployed, and why people live poor and die prematurely from smoking, 
alcoholism, overweight, gambling, illicit drug use, unsafe sex, and other risky activities.  
This relatively tractable modification of economic theory unambiguously increases 
realism and seems to have many economic implications; this largely explains its rapid 
recent growth, and explains why it will and should continue to replace (when the 
distinction matters) exponential even more rapidly in coming years.  
 
 
III.  Themes and Perspectives 
 
The examples in Section II are manifestly not an exhaustive list of even the most 
important departures from classical assumptions that have been identified by 
psychologists or have been investigated by behavioral economists.  Rather than providing 
more examples, I turn now to a consideration of some of the more general issues in why 






 22 Psychological Economics and Mainstream Economics 
 
How can economists embrace all that is good in economics while dedicating ourselves to 
more realistic conception of human nature as it pertains to economic situations?  The 
methods of economic analysis—methodological individualism, mathematical 
formalization of assumptions, logical analysis of the consequences of those assumptions, 
and sophisticated experimental and field-empirical testing—have many virtues.  But 
these methods create a necessary evil: We must use highly simplified and stylized models 
of human cognition, preferences, and behavior that, in every instance, omit a tremendous 
amount of psychological reality.  To formulate precise and testable hypotheses, ignoring 
some facet of human nature is unavoidable. 
  Psychology, by contrast, does (and should) dig deeper into the details of human 
nature, and isn’t (and shouldn’t be) as obsessed with the mathematical precision, 
generality, and empirical implementability of its findings.  With these tradeoffs in mind, 
the different “scientific preferences” between the disciplines of psychology and 










While Figure 1 does reflect a big part of the reason economists employ less 
psychologically-realistic assumptions than do psychologists, I think there are at least two 
 23 ways that it fully explains neither the difference between the disciplines nor the resistance 
to psychological economics. 
First, the realization that many details of human behavior must be ignored does 
not justify blanket complacency about the behavioral validity of our assumptions.  It is 
plainly and patently bad social science to say we don’t care how realistic our assumptions 
are.  In the dimensions of Figure 1, economists’ preferences should be steeper than 
psychologists’—but not vertical.  When the truth is complicated, then it is complicated; 
and when these complications need to be attended to do insightful research, then they 
need to be attended to.
12 
The second reason the above preferences don’t seem to be the real issue is 
apparent when you think about it: Economists can’t really claim (with a straight 
collective face) to be very “complexity-averse.”  Look at our journals.  Look at our 
emphasis in publication and job promotion on technical prowess at manipulating 
complicated models or data sets.  Look at the latest game-theoretic solution concepts or 
the latest life-cycle savings models.  Economists do not shy away from complicated 
models nearly as much as some claim when embroiled in the midst of abstract 
methodological debates.  It is odd on the one hand to be told during such debates that 
economists must forego behavioral realism for the sake of keeping our models simple—
when in the other hand we are holding a copy of Econometrica. 
Indeed, the disconnect between the professed urgency to keep things simple and 
the actuality of a very complicated models is most frustrating for behavioral economists 
when unparsimonious and intractable hypotheses have been proposed merely because 
they use “standard” assumptions.  To return to the earlier example, early attempts to 
explain behavior in experiments such as the ultimatum game as not really being 
departures from self-interest would—if actually followed through on in developing 
economic applications—generate more complicated models than the types of social-
preference models currently being developed.
13  Similarly, I think it is clear that ten years 
                                                 
12 As Albert Einstein put it, “Make your theory as simple as possible—but no simpler.” 
13  I am not claiming that the models of social preferences being developed to explain 
rejections in the ultimatum game, for instance, will be as simple as the unmodified self-
interested model that predicts no rejections.  I am claiming that if economists actually 
 24 from now we will have reasonably tractable present-biased models of savings patterns 
that are more general, more accurate, and simpler than recent rational-choice models that 
try to explain savings behavior that cannot be accommodated by the simpler rational-
choice models.  There are many other examples where behavioral hypotheses will end up 
providing simpler, more tractable, and more useful (less post hoc) explanations than 
existing models.  Especially when realizing that economists will become more agile over 
time in working with psychologically-inspired models as we familiarize ourselves with 
them, it is empirically false that these psychological models will be significantly more 
complicated than the classical models that have less explanatory power.  
  All said, my impression is that the real difference in taste between psychological 
economics (as I envision it) and a lot of classical economics is better represented by the 














                                                                                                                                                 
formalized some of the verbal explanations of reputations models and signaling theories 
that predict actual behavior such as ultimatum-game rejections, then these formalized 
models would likely be more complicated than the social-preferences models being 
developed.  
 25 Cautions and Worries 
 
As the amount of research integrating psychology into economics expands, we will of 
course see more research in this arena that is bad, and most of the potential flaws that 
might arise parallel those that can be found in any research program.  But there are two 
types of problems to which psychological economics is particularly susceptible. 
First, the growing acceptance of behavioral economics has made some economists 
overly receptive to alternative assumptions that are no better grounded in psychological 
reality than the classical assumptions they are replacing.  We must never lose sight of the 
goal of making economic assumptions more realistic.  The goal is not merely to replace 
existing assumptions with random different ones.  It is to replace the ones that are 
importantly imperfect with new ones that better capture realistic and economically 
important aspects of human nature.  This means both recognizing how right so many 
economics assumptions are, and being discriminating about the psychological soundness 
of the new evidence.  The standard for alternatives ought not be just whether there exists 
a “psychological” explanation, but does the evidence (and, where appropriate, intuition) 
indicate that it is the right explanation?  
  My second worry about the development of psychological economics is a bit 
more speculative, and based on impressions I have about not the research and modeling 
of psychology, but rather the psychology of research and modeling.  I argued above that 
there is no inherent negative correlation between psychological realism on the one hand, 
and taste for tractability, formalism, parsimony, and simplification on the other hand.  
But, historically, and currently, there is a correlation between those who like clear and 
simple mathematical models and those who care about and study behavioral realism.  The 
psychology of modeling and research may help explain why one discipline (psychology) 
studies people in detail without precise simplified models while another (economics) 
pervasively employs precise models without seriously attending to the behavioral reality 




 26 The history of the Victorian Age will never be written: we know too much 
about it.  For ignorance is the first requisite of the historian—ignorance, 
which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits, with a placid 
perfection unattainable by the highest art. 
  —Lytton Strachey, preface to Eminent Victorians 
 
Strachey here seemed to imply the discipline of history—that seeks to capture the general 
patterns, and the spirit of an age—is crippled if we know enough details about an era to 
realize that no simple story really gets things quite right.  Similarly, I get the impression 
that knowing the messy reality of human psychology hampers our willingness to model 
general patterns with simple, stylized models.  We find it harder to construct simple 
models if we don’t first convince ourselves that people really are as simple as our model 
says.  This is unfortunate, and may in part explain the bifurcation between psychology 
and economics back when the two disciplines separated.  And I have a “separation 
anxiety” about current research trends: Those that employ precise formal models are keen 
to avoid studying the behavioral evidence so as to convince themselves that we have our 
models just right; and those that are keen to improve the realism of our assumptions fret 
so much about getting the details right that they do not tolerate usefully stylized models.
14   
  I may be naïve about our ability to perform the “highest art” in coping with messy 
reality, but I hope our discipline doesn’t re-bifurcate into behavioralists and modelers.  
Just as knowing that no simple generalization about a time and place is literally true 
shouldn’t prevent historians from being willing to attempt usefully general statements, so 
too learning enough psychology to know that no simple generalization about some facet 
                                                 
14 For example, recall that present-biased preferences better describes the way people 
discount than does exponential discounting.  To my knowledge, the simple, unadorned 
exponential discounted-utility model explains no data set as well as the simple, 
unadorned present-biased-preferences discounted-utility model when the two make 
substantially different predictions.  But there is also some convincing research showing 
that neither discounted-utility model can really capture all behavior.  Since those who are 
aware of the greater behavioral accuracy of the present-biased model are more likely to 
be aware of the imperfections in the present-biased model, the bifurcation I fear has 
started to appear—some researchers made aware of the more extended evidence have 
used the not-one-hundred-percent-correct feature of the hyperbolic-discounting function 
as an argument against it.  Worse, and rather incoherently, this has in turn been picked up 
by some economists as a justification for sticking with the exponential model. 
 27 of human behavior is literally true shouldn’t prevent us from attempting to develop 
stylized, tractable models that aid us in economic insight. 
 
 
Some Common Objections 
 
I now discuss some of the types of explanations I’ve seen and heard for why economists 
should resist greater psychological realism. I’ll begin with some seemingly 
methodological arguments.  One class of arguments derives from the following 
understandable plea: 
  
“We Can’t Consider All Alternatives.” 
 
There are an infinite number of theories that are consistent with every empirical finding.  
Hence, we need some sort of discipline to not have a new theory for every new 
experimental paper.  Economists worry that, if we allow new assumptions, then 
researchers could come along and assume anything.   
  In this sense, the reaction to psychological economics is similar to the reactions 
by economists to other innovations.  As game theory, information economics, and 
especially transactions-costs economics rose to supplement Walrasian economics, it was 
often complained (and sometimes with merit) that “you can explain anything” with these 
models, and hence embracing this broadening of the discipline of economics will turn it 
into an undisciplined non-discipline, with no restrictions whatsoever on our assumptions. 
As with the resistance to the previous challenges to the status quo, this worry 
about psychological economics has some merit.  But even more so than with the previous 
resistance, it seems to me mostly misguided.  In the case of psychological economics, the 
biggest problem with this complaint is blatant: As noted above, the whole point of this 
agenda is not to come up with random new undisciplined hypotheses.  While it is true 
that psychological economics will lend itself to a healthier tolerance for ad hoc 
assumptions—sometimes the complexity and context-specificity  of humans merit a 
tolerance for a wider range of context-specific modifications to assumptions—observing 
the actual content of recent behavioral economics does not lend itself to interpreting 
 28 proposed new assumptions as random.  A more common complaint about some 
behavioral economists (myself included) by those who’ve heard us frequently is the 
opposite one—that we are tediously repeating the same themes over and over again.  
Principles such as loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity, and self-control problems are 
ones that we are using over and over again to explain a wide range of phenomena, not 
post hoc inventions to explain particular behavioral anomalies. 
  Where does the perception that psychological economists are making random, “ad 
hoc” assumptions come from?  I think it comes largely from economists’ unawareness of 
the psychological and experimental evidence.  The assumptions being proposed are not 
the ones economists have been trained in, and as a discipline this makes them seem like 
they are coming from nowhere.  I think many economists tacitly use the fallacious rule of 
thumb: 
 
“Non-Varian hoc, ergo ad hoc” 
 
Translated from the Latin, this means:  “That assumption was not in our graduate 
microeconomics text; therefore it is some random assumption that you’re making up.”  
This reaction is wrong-headed on many accounts.  First, psychologists did learn many of 
these principles from their graduate texts.  Second, many behavioral hypotheses (e.g. we 
get angry, we have self-control problems) we knew before graduate school—and 
unlearned in graduate school.  (Or at least trained ourselves not to think about when we 
have our economists’ hats on.)  Finally, especially with the advent of experimental 
economics, even if economists are unconvinced by extant psychological evidence, our 
reaction ought not be the presumption that the evidence is wrong.  We ought to test it.  In 
summary, whether or not economists are at this moment familiar with the new 
assumptions being proposed, they are not coming out of thin air.  They are being 
proposed because they seem to be behaviorally true. 
  Sometimes the resistance to new assumptions seems not so much from 
economists seriously challenging the validity of these alternative assumptions, but rather 
from a perceived methodological mandate not to even debate the validity of alternatives.  
Some economists seem to come close to the belief in maintaining classical assumptions 
against just-as-simple and more realistic alternatives with the methodological claim that a 
 29 discipline’s current assumptions automatically deserve a sort of epistemological pride of 
place.  This amounts to a sort of prescriptive or normative Kuhnianism:  
 
“Thomas Kuhn says we shouldn’t ‘think outside the box’ …  
                                                        until the box is wholly shattered” 
 
Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) familiar insights into the difficulty communities of scientists have 
in abandoning set paradigms were not (as I interpret it) prescriptive—they were 
descriptive.  It is not good science to declare we shouldn’t mess incrementally with a 
paradigm, nor to insist that incremental critiques and improvements ought be ignored 
until we replace the current paradigm in one fell swoop.  As we find pieces of the 
classical model that are wrong, then insofar as we can recognize how to replace them, we 
ought replace them. 
  A related methodological encumbrance to the progress of psychological 
economics is one of the most powerful mechanisms across disciplines to maintaining 
current hypotheses (and paradigms) against the preponderance of the evidence that these 
hypotheses are probably false: Placing the burden of proof on hypotheses outside the 
paradigm.  In both formal statistical terms and in more subtle ways, it is clear that many 
of the instances where economists have argued the current models are adequate, they do 
not mean that the current model seems to fit better than proposed alternatives, but merely 
that the classical model isn’t yet provably false.  Maintaining the classical model as the 
null hypothesis that must be disproved lends itself to maintaining the model even when 
the accumulated evidence is strongly against it.  It seems to me plainly appropriate in 
scientific terms to stop treating the classical assumptions as the maintained hypotheses in 
our analysis, and start treating them as special cases, corresponding to particular 
parameter values of a generalized model, and then investigating what are the best fits for 
those parameter values. 
  On particular variant of the view that we ought shun psychological improvements 
to our models until a superior alternative is proven is that most mischievous of clichés: 
 
“If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” 
 
 30 The standard model is successful in explaining a lot, it is sometimes argued, so why make 
a fuss?  Besides a general heuristic of avoiding complacency-enhancing clichés, this 
attitude ought be avoided because it misconstrues the nature of psychological alternatives 
to current assumptions.  It is illogical to doubt a behavioral hypothesis by showing that 
standard hypothesis being challenged isn’t 100% wrong.  The right question is whether 
standard assumptions are less than 100% right, and whether the shortfalls are sufficiently 
identifiable, sufficiently systematic, and sufficiently important that economists should 
study them.  Many mostly right assumptions are importantly wrong or incomplete, and 
after decades of figuring out all the ways our assumptions are mostly right, it is more 
productive to start asking how they are importantly wrong. 
The if-it-ain’t-broke criterion is frustratingly beside the point to those of us who 
believe that classical economic assumptions are a wonderful foundation upon which to 
build.  People are largely self-interested.  If we are allowed only one hyphenated 
adjective describing human motivation, “self-interested” would be my choice.  But we 
are not completely self-interested, and the departures appear not to be economically 
negligible.  People have some self-control and significant propensity to pursue long-run 
desires over immediate gratification.  But we are not completely self-controlled, and the 
departures appear not to be economically negligible.  Much of human behavior is usefully 
conceived of in terms of rational maximization of coherent preferences.  But our tastes 
are not completely well-defined, stable, and coherent, and the departures appear not to be 
economically negligible.  In all these realms, economics is not “broke” in the sense of 
being useless, but it should still be fixed. 
  Besides “methodological” arguments for dismissal of the agenda of psychological 
economics, there are also substantive ones.  The one that I’ve heard most often and in the 
most variants—and that perplexes me most—is the assertion that we needn’t worry about 
unfamiliar new assumptions, because they won’t survive in markets.  In its generic form, 
it can be stated as follows: 
 
“Markets will wipe [any unfamiliar psychological phenomenon] out” 
 
While I have occasionally seen specific variants of this argument in print, most often it is 
made orally and on the fly, in the context of rebutting.   More often than not, “wipe-out 
 31 arguments” are logically wrong.  They are not bad psychology, but bad economics.  In 
our discipline ruled by careful, formal arguments, the frequency of oral, loose, off-the-
cuff seminar-audience arguments about markets negating departures from our habitual 
assumptions is striking. 
  There are realms, such as low-transactions-costs asset markets, where markets 
might greatly diminish the implications of some psychological phenomena.  While an 
active debate exists as to interpreting how influential irrationalities are in even the most 
competitive asset markets, I want to here state three reasons why even if highly 
competitive asset markets do wipe out the influence of psychological phenomena, we 
should still not ignore the psychological phenomena.  
  The first is the very definition of “wipe out”.  Financial economists often care 
only about approximate market prices, and explicitly rely on arbitrage arguments to 
explain how markets will be “efficient” through the efforts of even a few more rational or 
better informed traders.  But the existence of rational traders equilibrating prices by 
arbitraging against irrational agents means that there are distributional and efficiency 
consequences.  For those of us who care quite a lot not just about the trading price of 
assets, but also whether some investors are failing to maximize their lifetime utility—
retiring poorer or sending their children to less expensive colleges than they could—the 
market efficiency definition used by financial economists is inappropriately limited.  It is 
not the same one used in economics more generally, which concerns not solely the price 
generated, but—far more importantly—the allocation achieved.  Insofar as asset markets 
influence the economy not solely through how the prices of stocks and bonds affect 
company investment designs, economists should care about far more than this one aspect 
of asset markets.  Debates over market efficiency in this context have been hijacked by 
the narrow and specific aspect of efficiency employed by only one field within our 
discipline.  
Second, not all economic behavior is mediated by frictionless, Walrasian markets.  
It has been a long time in most economics departments, journals, etc., since we have 
 32 assumed perfectly competitive markets as the only institution of interest.
15  My point is 
not that studying psychological phenomena in the context of competitive markets is 
unimportant.  Because markets are such a major institution, and may magnify or mitigate 
the effects of certain psychological phenomena, it is important to investigate the market 
implications of these phenomena.  But perfect competition is manifestly not the sole 
environment of interest.
16   
This leads to my final point about the inappropriateness of ignoring phenomena 
merely because they don’t manifest themselves in competitive markets.  If the effects of 
some aspect of human nature are “wiped out” by realistic markets, this is very important 
fact—and arguably intensifies rather than diminishes the importance for economics of 
studying that aspect of human nature.  One of the main things economists teach the 
world—arguably,  the main thing—is about how markets compare to other allocation 
mechanisms.  A central theme of every Economics 1 course is the putative efficiency of 
markets in comparison to distortionary taxes, natural or unnatural monopolies, price 
regulations, etc.  Hence, it is wrong to say that we are unconcerned with some 
psychological feature of market participants just because markets wipe out the 
implications of the feature.  To compare market outcomes to other outcomes, this is 
precisely the type of thing we do care about.  If, for instance, markets destroy fair 
behavior that might manifest itself in non-market settings, then we should (when 
articulating our welfare theorems) compare unfair market behavior and outcomes to 
potentially fairer ones in non-market settings.  Or if markets somehow eliminate 
                                                 
15  Historically, the focus on highly competitive market environments has been especially 
pronounced among experimental economists.  It was jarring for me as I came of graduate 
school (at MIT) twelve years ago and started following experimental economics to see 
the very narrow notion of economic institutions (typically, highly anonymous double 
auctions) studied by the experimental economists.  This focus on perfect competition, 
right or wrong, simply didn’t match the focus of research and teaching at MIT and much 
the rest of economics.  Fortunately, this narrow focus of experimental economics has 
decayed magnificently in recent years. 
16 Interestingly, even economists who do research on non-Walrasian institutions seem 
prone to apply the Walrasian setting as the test of whether a phenomenon is of interest.  It 
seems that, when engaged in a challenge to our familiar way of doing things, we tend to 
invoke a archetype of an economic situation that does not correspond to the actual 
economic situations we study typically in our normal-science, workaday research. 
 33 cognitive errors that we’d see in non-competitive environments, this would be a major, 
under-explored efficiency feature of markets.
17  To many of us, comparative institutional 
analysis is the core goal of economics.  To abandon this mode of analysis when we 
consider departures from classical assumptions is to abandon a big piece of the classical 
goals of economics. 
There are many other objections given to introducing psychological phenomena 
into economic analysis.  In lieu of a more complete list of such objections and my 
rebuttals, and to elucidate some of the above arguments, a shall instead relate a none-too-
subtle parable that continues from the movie example earlier in the essay, and that 
continues with that theme of how differently economists react to unfamiliar assumptions 
than to classical ones. 
 
 
At the Movies: Economics from Another Planet 
 
I earlier illustrated an untenable difference in economists’ reaction—and standards of 
proof—in accepting the evidence for the unfamiliar assumption that people have a taste 
for retaliating against unfair treatment to such paragons of acceptable preferences as 
enjoying action movies.  This example can be stretched further.   
Suppose that in another galaxy there is a planet—Planet Nonhollywood—where 
the actual economy developed exactly has it has here on Earth, and that the economics 
profession evolved almost exactly the same as here.  There is just one difference between 
the economic professions on the two planets: On Planet Nonhollywood, economists had 
traditionally not studied preferences over “entertainment” items—things that weren’t 
physically consumed, but merely “psychologically consumed”.  I don’t want to be 
                                                 
17 The argument to ignore more realistic assumptions simply because classical ones do 
fine in Walrasian markets is analogous to a decision to stop assuming that firms 
maximize profits rather than to (more simply) assume that they set price equal to 
marginal cost.  The price-equals-marginal-cost hypothesis does fine in competitive 
environments, so, it might be asked, why worry about departures from that assumption?  
The answers are many.  To take one example, price-equals-marginal-cost would be an 
 34 judgmental about the coherence of our colleagues across the universe; for whatever 
reason, they had developed what they thought in their own minds was a sensible 
distinction.  Roughly corresponding to what we would label entertainment items, they 
had a strong sense that things that could not be eaten, touched, pushed, etc., and 
especially that were temporary, were simply not a direct part of anybody’s utility 
function. 
By contrast to the economists, psychologists on Planet Non-Hollywood talked all 
the time about such phenomena, but economists dismissed them as wooly-headed and 
unscientific.  Because the economy is identical to that of the Earth’s, many people 
(including economists) would go see movies and entertain themselves in other ways.  
And a few economists started to suggest that maybe people did intrinsically enjoy “non-
tangible consumption,” noting all the money in the economy devoted to the enjoyment of 
others’ company, entertainment industry, the role of ambience in restaurants, the fact that 
people travel to see beautiful buildings and paintings even if they couldn’t touch them.  
But most economists had simply managed to ignore these phenomena, or come up with 
alternative explanations using (what to them were) acceptable, “classical” assumptions.  
Now imagine you travel to Planet Nonhollywood to give seminars on the movie 
industry, arguing that people intrinsically value movies.  The following are some of the 
responses you might encounter. 
 
“But there are alternative ‘standard’ explanations!” 
 
Your evidence was very weak, and acceptable standard explanations abound for why 
people would pay to see movies even if they didn’t intrinsically enjoy them.  When so 
many standard explanations exist, why introduce a crazy new assumption?  For instance, 
movie-goers could be going just for the food; and indeed, cinemas make more money 
from the sale of food than from the movies themselves.  The large amounts of food 
consumed—and the convenient, efficient seating by which to eat it—support this 
explanation.  Indeed, all sorts of predictions of the standard model are borne out, making 
                                                                                                                                                 
awful assumption to maintain in our research and in our teaching when discussing the 
effects of monopoly. 
 35 the new-fangled wanting-to-see-the-movie interpretation redundant.  For instance, the 
better and cheaper the food, the more likely people are to go.
18 
  Also, you didn’t adequately demonstrate that people weren’t going to the movies 
intending to make money rather than spending it—hoping to find money underneath the 
seats in front of them.  When you admitted not having the data to rebut this hypothesis, 
but said you found it implausible, you are dismissed as unscientific, and treated to an 
anecdote of an audience member once having found twenty Nonhollywood dollars on his 
seat.   
  Or, you were told, movie-going could be a signal of wealth by wasting money: 
There is lots of evidence that people (especially males trying attract mates) like to pay for 
movies.  The fact that when wealth-signaling is most likely—as on courting rituals—
people are most likely to pay for the movies strongly supports this explanation.  Audience 
members in fact provided anecdotes of all the times they went to movies they didn’t want 
to see merely to be on a date—and they paid for both tickets, hence doubly signaling 
their wealth.  When you asked them why their date wanted to go, you got told that the 
move (and the food) were free to the date, all supporting the standard interpretation of no 
intrinsic taste for movies. 
  Other audience members argued: 
 
“But the alleged ‘preference’ is ‘unstable’” 
 
It was often pointed out, and backed up by research, that this alleged preference for 
seeing movies is highly sensitive, and therefore not a real preference.  While it is true that 
some people like going to the movie, it varies a great deal. It depends on mood, time of 
day, etc.  Indeed, while behavioral researchers claim to have evidence of people willing 
                                                 
18 And when you unwisely pointed out the huge demand for TVs, where the food-buying 
explanation seemed more tenuous, you were readily rebutted by being told that people 
merely watched TV for for the information gleaned from cereal and detergent 
commercials, and that the companies paying shows to air commercials were simply 
signaling their quality by being willing to pay for the wasted minutes of non-commercial 
watching, and that it was an equilibrium for viewers to sit through shows they didn’t want 
to see because they knew they would be rewarded by informative commercials. 
 36 to pay for movies, a great deal of experimental evidence by economic experimentalists 
show that this taste goes away under only slightly different conditions.   
Moreover, when the experiment was done properly—in the way economic 
experimentalists understood how to do experiments—the taste for movies nearly 
completely went away.  Evidence from well-run economic experiments shows that this 
alleged taste for movies is highly ephemeral. 
 
“But evidence shows people learn they don’t like movies …” 
 
While a few psychologists have argued that they have evidence that people seem to like 
movies, these experiments are run under novel conditions, and don’t allow learning. 
Indeed, the standard in psychology experiments was to only ask people to see a movie 
once.  Hence, you were told, we do not learn whether this behavior represents a robust 
preference.  But experiments showed that, while a person might pay $8 to see the movie 
once, maybe twice, if you keep asking him for $8 to see the movie, eventually stops 
paying.  Clearly he learns he doesn’t want to see the movie!  Once play “converges” to 
“equilibrium” behavior by subjects, we see no genuine preference for movies.
19 
Indeed, an audience member pointed out that this provides further support for the 
money-under-the-seats interpretation of movie going: People start going to the movies, 
then when they don’t find money under the seats in front of them, they learn it involves 
losing money rather than gaining money, so they stop going.   
Another audience member pointed out that this movie-seeing couldn’t last, since 
it is clearly irrational: 
 
“But this behavior is ‘non-consequentialist’, and hence irrational!” 
 
The notion that people might care directly for the movie they see is so much 
“psychobabble.”  Movie-goers walk out of the theatre with no more than they walked in, 
$8 poorer.  To pay $8 for a two-hour process that puts nothing in a person’s hand or 
                                                 
19  Audience members admitted that subjects still paid to see Johnny Depp movies (he is 
as popular there as here) after twenty rounds, but noted that the trend was downward, so 
that surely if the experiment were conducted for more rounds, they would have 
eventually learned that they don’t like watching even Johnny Depp. 
 37 stomach is, you are told, irrational.  Some researchers had started to toy with such “non-
consequentialist” preferences, and conceded it was an interesting possibility, but realized 
such preferences couldn’t be rational—getting nothing for your $8 can’t really be 
rational.   
  Indeed, if there were people who went around giving $8 for nothing in return, 
they would quickly be driven from the market, so that there behavior would not matter: 
 
“But those behaving like this will be driven from the market!” 
 
An audience member assured you that somebody willing to pay $8 for a movie could be 
“Dutch-booked”: If people paid $8 just to sit in front of a screen, then somebody could 
make money off of them!
20  When you respond that, yes, somebody could and is making 
money off of those willing to pay the $8, another audience member assures you that if 
people were really willing to pay $8 for nothing in return, they would in short order be 
bilked of all their money by an arbitrageur.  When you shyly suggest that a consumer’s 
willingness sometimes to give some of his money to see a movie doesn’t mean he’ll pay 
infinite amounts to anybody who offers movies, or suggest it might be costly to provide 
these movies, you get scoffed at for being ad hoc, changing your story, and being very 
loose about what preferences you were proposing.  
Somebody else also points out that, because people are irrationally paying $8 for 
nothing, such movie-goers will be driven from the market by those who are as happy not 
seeing the movies.  These others will have all this money that movie-goers won’t have, 
and hence have greater survivorship in the goods market.  Moreover, because the 
spending needs of non-movie-goers are lower, they will undercut movie-goers in the 
labour market, accepting the same jobs at lower wages, so that would-be movie-goers 
will be left unemployed and not be able to go to see movies anyhow!   
That line of argument makes no sense to you, and as you are trying to articulate a 
rebuttal to such a far-fetched story, you get hit with the seminar-stopping argument you 
always fear: 
  
                                                 
20  Nobody on Planet Nonhollywood had any more idea as to where the term “Dutch 
book” comes from than we do on Planet Earth. 
 38 “But none of the evidence is for ‘real stakes’” 
 
Somebody raises his hands, and while acknowledging that maybe your experimental 
results are robust, you haven’t demonstrated willingness to pay for movies for stakes that 
really matter.  “Sure,” an audience member starts, “they will go see the movie for eight 
dollars—but would they for eight hundred dollars?”   
You know you are beaten.  You hem and haw and explain you would love to get 
more funds from the Nonhollywood Science Foundation to write bigger-stakes 
experiments, and note that a colleague has run similar experiments on a poorer nearby 
planet, and while the willingness to pay for movies is smaller, it is still non-negligible.  
You can’t convince the audience you still care about movie-going even though it involves 
non-huge stakes.  You are not going to convince this audience.
21 
 
                                                 
21 But, happily, that times are changing, and you find friendlier audiences willing to 
acknowledge a taste for entertainment.  You begin your seminar at some such place, and 
look forward to discussing how you measure and model this taste for entertainment and 
its economic implications when you get asked … “How would this evolve?” An audience 
member points out that, while your evidence is interesting and convincing, at first blush it 
would seem that those without the taste for wasting money on movies would surely have 
better survival likelihood.  So the really interesting question is how these preferences 
would survive evolution.  You say politely (or not so politely) why you don’t care how it 
evolved, but felt sure it was there.  You have an argument back and forth, before 
continuing with your seminar to a patently bored audience, who are busy asking 
themselves the more interesting question of how this new-fangled motive you are 
discussing could have evolved. 
  After this seminar, out of curiosity you study the recent seminars on Planet 
Nonhollywood.  You estimate that at about 85% of seminars about “non-tangible 
consumption” (like movies) and 2% on seminars on “real” consumption, (like taxi rides), 
speakers are asked how the behavior would evolve.  And, in reading, you notice that 50% 
of the papers written on movie-going and 0% written on taxi rides are about how it would 
be evolutionarily possible for people to want to consume the product.  None of the 
burgeoning research on the evolutionary roots of entertainment-preferences seem 
equipped to update anybody’s beliefs about whether people actually go to the movies, but 
it was argued that it was important to understand these evolutionary roots of the 
phenomenon.  One reason given was that it would help persuade other economists that it 
was possible to want to go see movies, so they would stop looking for other explanations.  
On that score, you felt you needed to make your peace with the emphasis on evolution as 
it was helping you get economists to accept the reality of this preference (which you 
thought they should accept merely because it was real). 
 39 Back On Earth 
  
Is this tale of arguments against the people-enjoy-movies hypothesis a fair parable of 
what kinds of arguments we see here on Earth against the sorts of psychological 
assumptions I have discussed? 
  It would of course be unfair to say that all economists who have resisted 
psychological assumptions have made arguments analogous to those above.  In fact, few 
of these arguments are written down (though some are) because they would look 
transparently silly if they were made about what we (on Earth) consider standard 
preferences.  The intended moral of my tale is, of course, precisely that many of the 
arguments used against unfamiliar assumptions are awful economics and don’t hold up to 
scrutiny.  They would be embarrassing to authors when made in print, and would in any 
event not be accepted by editors. 
  But these types of arguments were the types of arguments frequently made at 
seminars ten years ago, and occasionally made today, against unfamiliar but 
psychologically sound assumptions.  In fact, many of the examples parallel economists’ 
reactions to those researchers trying to argue that people have intrinsic taste for fairness 
and other non-self-interested preferences.  These are the types of arguments I used to hear 
all the time (but far less frequently now). 
  All manner of self-interested explanations for rejecting unfair offers in the 
ultimatum game were offered.  To those of us who see nothing mysterious about rejecting 
such offers, the pursuit of money-maximizing interpretations is as strange as a money-
maximizing interpretation of movie-going.  The fascination many economists have had 
with the “instability” of the taste for fairness—and the predisposition to argue that the 
experimental manipulation that produces the least concern for fairness yields the “true” 
stable preferences—has struck some of us as wholly disproportionate in comparison to 
the lack of focus on the “instability” of classical assumptions about preferences.   
Showing that there exist conditions where a preference for fairness “goes away” isn’t a 
demonstration that these preferences don’t exist.  And the tendency of experimental 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 40 economists to assume that all temporal changes in behavior represent “learning” would 
be recognized as transparently misguided if applied to standard assumptions.  It is silly to 
label the diminishing marginal utility of seeing the same movie repeatedly as a person 
learning he doesn’t like the movie.  But experimental economists studying the important 
topic of learning, or wedded to a methodology of repetition in running experiments, are 
ignoring the possibility that people with a taste for revenge and similar non-self-
interested tastes might similarly exhibit satiation.
22 
  And the consequentialist arguments that those who reject money in the ultimatum 
game get “nothing” in return similarly derives from habitual thinking what constitutes 
“something” and what constitutes “nothing”.  And the related arguments that paying 
money for nothing but the satisfaction of revenge is a money-losing behavior and 
therefore unable to survive in the market or in evolution seem highly confused.  Every 
time a consumer buys anything he loses money.  And every time he buys something 
without the highest caloric and nutritional survival payoff we have an evolutionary 
mystery on our hands for those that want to solve an evolutionary mystery.  For those 
interested in economic outcomes, it will be more sensible and more adaptive to assume 
that people are willing to spend money on whatever they are willing to spend money on.  
  And at the lion’s share of seminars on non-self-interested behavior five years ago 
the speaker would be cross-examined about the low stakes in the experiments being 
discussed.  It is perfectly reasonable to care a lot about what the shape of the demand 
curve for revenge looks like.  (And the answer as far as the evidence so far suggests is 
that it is not very steep—many people are willing to pay quite a lot for justice.)  But the 
mere fact that the taste for revenge and fairness is finite, and diminishes when it is more 
costly to purchase, makes it like every single other taste economists study, not something 
                                                 
22 This mis-identification is very understandable both because learning is such an 
important phenomenon and because existing theories of social preferences don’t provide 
predictions about how behavior might change over time.  But the tendency to equate 
temporal changes in behavior with learning economic experiments is clearly something 
economists wouldn’t be inclined to do in other contexts.  And especially in experiments 
that are cognitively and strategically simple, interpreting a trend towards self-interested 
behavior as “learning” by inherently self-interested players, rather than satiation in 
pursuit of social goals, or reference-dependent adjustment of preferences, strikes me as a 
bad default presumption. 
 41 to be dismissed.  And the presumption that economists don’t consider even $8 





Above I have proposed that economists have until recently resisted new assumptions 
about non-self-interested preferences based on economically flawed arguments.  Similar 
flawed arguments are used to resist other modifications that will improve the 
psychological realism of economics.  As economists are starting to realize that meta-
arguments for dismissing these modifications are not helpful to economics, and to realize 
that adding greater psychological realism will improve it rather than undermine 
economics, such defensive arguments are decreasing.  Happily, the trend is towards 
integrating apparently true and apparently relevant new psychological assumptions into 
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